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The r':lnm·nl of the Fourth Intcrnationc.l Tin Jl.grecm::mt, which expires on 
30 Jtmo 1976, is to bo nogotia,tcd 1.L''ldcr UNCTAD aus,icos at a confcrcncG 
to be hold in Geneva from 20 11ay to 20 June 1975. The Prep<?.ratory 
Com.'llittoc, sot up by th-.: International Tin Com1eil, h:1s drown up a draft 
of a Fifth ~lgroomcnt which, togeth~r with aHGrnativo proposals, will be 
submi tt od to th<J Co:1fercnco as a wor:d~'lg paper. 
The purpose of this commu_"lica,tion is to indicate the :,road linos of the 
C ::>mmunity' s position in the negotiations to be conducted at the 
Conference. 
In vim..: of the urgE:ncy o:: this matt Jr, this clocument must be studied and 
a decision taken a8 soon f"-S possible, corte,inly before the beginning- of 
the negotiations (20 Nay), by a suitable procedure' commensurate with 
this urgency. 
1. All the Member States arc. parties to the Fourth Tin .~."t..greement adopted 
on 15 May 1970. The Cor;u:mni ty, which signed and approved the Agroaaent 
on 27 January 1971 and 22 !!arch 1972, respectively, also participates 
but has no voting rights. 
2. Ths o"Jjcctivc of the International Tin .J..grccnont is to str.bilizc tho tin 
r.1arkot so as to: 
(a) provide for edjustmont between supply and demand and alleviate serious 
difficulties arising from a surplus or &1ortag~ of tin; 
(b) prevent o:wessive fluctuations in the price of tin; 
(c) safeguard ancl help to increase the earnings of the producer 
cotmt ri c s; 
(d) ensure an adequate supply at equitable prices for consumers. 
3• Accordingly, the Agreement contn.ins th~ follol-Jing provisions: 
(a) a buffer stock, the ma:dm'UI1l tn.rgct of Hhich, in the case of the 
Fourth ~'l.grecment, is cquivnlent to 20 000 metric tons of tin metal; 
(b) a price intorv0ntion system with floor and ceiling prices; 
(c) buffer stock regulations which govern operations by the Buffer Stock 
Manager (BS!-0 in the context of the relationship between the market 
price for tin and the intervention prices; 
(d) export control measures; 






4.·The new Agreement is aimed particularly at strengthening cooperation 
between producer and consumer countries to help the developing pro-· 
ducer countries obtain the resources necessary for faster econ3mic 
growth and social development,. while taking account of the interests 
of consumers. Consequently, the main issues at the forthcoming nego-
ciations will include thG following; 
the price .intervention system, in particular the fixing of the' floor 
price; 
i 
- the size and financing of the buffer stook, especially the compulsory 
financial participation by the consumer countries; 
- management of the stock, and in part·icular the possibility sr other-
wise of the manager intervening in the m~ddle sector(l); 
- export control a~d the fixing of the stock levels of tin to be reached 
before a control period m~ be declared; 
- measures to be taken in periods of shortage a'1d how they can be made 
more effective. 
5. These metters directly affect the volume and terms of trade in tin and, 
taken as a whole, constitute commercial policy measures for the purposes 
of Article 113 of the EEC Treaty. Negotiations on these. matters must 
therefore be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Article 113. 
(l)The range between the floor and the ceiling price is divided into three 
sectors. At present the buffer stock manager ·mavr buy and· se·n·tin ''in" · · 
the upper and lower sectors. He may only intervene in the middle sector 
if specially authorized to do so by the International Tin Council, which 
is composed of representatives of all the contracting parties. 
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6. Only if the problems in question are properly exposed can the objectives 
of the Agreement be achieved and the interests of producers and con-
sumers be guaranteed. Since the Member States at present control 45 % 
of the total votes of the consumer countries in the Tin Council, the 
Community can pl~ a decisive part in the search for effective and 
balanced solutions. 
Apart from the commercial implications of these problems, attention 
should be paid to their impact on supplies to industries of the Col'lll:lWlity 
- the Community is almost totally dependent on imported tin, and its 
imports represent 35 % of total world trade in this commodity - and on 
the economic growth of the developing producer countries. 
The Commission working paper(l)presented to the Council Working Party 
on Commodities on 15 January 1975 set out various approaches to the 
problems in question. 
a) l!L2.~ intervention system 
The Commission feels that the three sectors of' the range between 
floor and ceiling price should be better distributed so that the 
middle sector is once again an area where the price might fluctuate 
freely. 
b) Bu.ff'er stook 
-.r_W:ot .... ....:..-.............. 
- ll~ The current maximum target for the buffer stook is 20 000 metric 
tons of tin !t would be realistic to increase this to 20 % of the 
volume of world trade (around 35 000 ne trio tons). 
EXperience and market trends have shown that the current maximum 
target is insufficient to fulfil the aims of the Agreement. 
(l)~l85/75 (COMER 30) 
. , 
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- ~cial aspects~ .. The preamble .to the Agraement. refers t.o. co-
operation ·bett.reon producer and consu.aer countries, but at present, 
this community of interests is not reflected in the respective 
financial contributiqns of these hro categories of countries. Apart 
from the significance of this problem for the Cowmunity's develop-
ment policy, it is clear that the interests of the consumer countries 
would be better safeguarded if they agreed to make financial con-
tributions towards the stock(l). 
The non-participation of consumer countries in the financing of the 
stock mcy prevent them from participating in its management and 
bdeed might further encourage the producers to conclude an agree-
J:l:::.l t between themscl ves. 
- £r~~t~ ~1e main point at issue here is whether as dem~1ded by 
··::J."l producer countries, the B.S.M. should be allowed to intervene in 
the middle sector(2 ). 
~n~e would transform the defence of the floor and ceiling prices into 
a support of a central price, introducing a degree of rigidity into 
the operations that would imply far-reaching changes in the nature 
and the objectives of.' the Agreement. 
c) ~popt control 
These provisions may by their very nature also affect th0 security of 
supplies to the importing countries and the Community in particular. 
By its limitations of stocks in the :producer countries export control 
can involve a fall in production which could have· a short- and medium-
, term imPact on the availability' of tin on the market. It will therefore 
·be nec~ssary in defining the criteria for its application to make it 
clear that this is a measure of last resort • 
• • ~ .... j ''''f•'- ~~~··-~ ........ . 
(1) Consideration will ha\~ to be given to the possibility: of ·intervention 
by certain international financial institutions. 
(2) See footnote 1 on page 3. 
-6 - . 
d) Me,asures to be taken in periods of short~ 
The Commission agrees with the Preparatory Committee that the present 
provisions are not sufficient to guarantee the consumer countries 
security of supply in time of shortage. It therefore considers that 
the existing measures should be strengthened and should include 
binding provisions similar to those for export control. 
Enlargement of the stock together with joint financing on an equal 
basis would in an;y case create a situation where shortages would be un-
likely to occur. 
7. The current provisions on the participation of intergovernmental organi-
zations, tvhich were largely drafted by non-lf.~ember states, do not adequately 
cover the Community's position. 
The Commission considers that the text shou~d be amended in order to clarify 
this position and more adequately safeguard Community interests, while at 
the same time giving all the contracting parties essential legal security. 
A new text based on texts already approved in the wheat, coffee and coooa 
agreements has already been presented(l). 
8. It would also be advisable at the next Tin Conference to have a single 
delegation comprising the Member States and the Community, with the . 
Commission representative putting forward the Community.position on mat-
ters for which the Community is responsible. 
The draft C~uncil Decision annexed to this document authorizes the Com-
mission to participate in negotiations on matters relating. to the oommon 
conunerci.al policy, particularly those listed in the annex to the draft, 
and on the conditions concerning Community's participation in the Fifth 
Agreement. 
(1) R/185/75 (COI,fim 30) 
' 
• 
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Recommendation for 
. a. Council. Decision 
on the .negotiation·of.the Fifth.n1ternational 
Tin Agreement _____________________________________ ._ ____ 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic. Community, 
and in particular Article 113 thereof; 
Having reJard to the rcco~~e~dation from the Commission; 
Whereas the Community signed the Fourth International Tin Agreement on 
27 January 1971 and approved it on 22. March 1972 (l)a.nd is a party to the 
Agreement; 
Whereas the said agreement expires on 30 June 1976; 
Whereas the Fifth International Tin Agreement is to be negotiat.ed· under the 
.. auspices of UNCTAD at an international conference to be held in Geneva from 
20 M<W to 20 June 1975; and· whereas the Community should take part in 
these negotiations, which will cover matters relating to its common commer-
cial policy, 
HAS ADOF'rED THIS DECISION; 
Sole article 
The Commission is hereby authorized to conduct, on behalf of the Community, 
the negotiation of ~he Fifth Internationa;I. Tin Agreement in matters within 
the Community competence. 
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in accordance with the 
instructions annexed hereto and in .coneultation .with the Special Committee 
set up under Article 113. 
(1) 0J No L 90, 17.4.72 p. 1 
Done at · Brtissels, · 
For the Council 
The President 
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Annex to the Recommendation for a Council Decision: Directives for the 
negotiation of the Fifth International Tin Afir.eement 
1. Intervention prices 
The division of the range between the floor price and the ceiling 
price into three sectors should be achieved in such a wey as to· 
reconstitute the middle sector as the area within which the price 
mey fluctuate freely. 
2. fuffer stock 
(a) Size 
-The maximum target of the stock should be approximately equivalent 
to 20 % of world. trade (around 35 000 metric tons). 
(b) Financial arrangements 
The principle of compulsory joint financing of the stock on an equal 
basis should be adopted. 
(c) Operation 
A restrictive position should be taken up on the question of a.llo;rl.ng 
the buffer stock manager to intervene in the middle sector. 
3. Export control 
-
Amendments should be proposed to the criteria for the application 
of such control to ensure that this is a measure of last resort. 
4. ]'ieasures to be taken in times cf. short'¥W .. 
This article should be strengthened for the benefit of the consumer 
countries by the adoption of binding provisions similar to those for 
export control. 
5. Communit~ partici~ation in \he Sgreement 
(a) Article 54 of the draft Agreement should be replaced by the following 






"Any reference in this Agreement to a Government, participatin~~ country 
or participant shall be construed as including a reference to the Euro-
pean Economic Community or to an intergovernmental organization having 
coqparable responsibilitiGs in respect of the negotiation, conclusion and 
application of internatio~al agreements, in particular conmodity agree-
ments. Accordingly, r~ference in this Agreement to signature, or to the 
deposit of instruments of ratifi0ation, approval or acceptance, or of a 
notification of intention to ratify, approve or accept, or of accession, 
by a Gover~~ent, participating country or participant is, in the case of 
such org&~izations, to be construed as including a reference to the sig-
nature, or the deposit of instruments of ratifio~tion, approval or accep-
tance, or of a notification of intention to ratify, approve or accept, or 
of accession by such an organization. 
Such an organization shall not itself have any votes, but in the case of a 
vote on matters within its competence, it shall be entitled to cast the 
vote of its Member States and shall cast them collectively. In such cases, 
the Member States of the organization in question sh~ll not be entitled 
to exercise their individual voting rights 11 • 
(b) It would also be necessar"J to i.."lSert in .1\.rticle 2 (Definitions) under the 
heading "Participating country", the words "or an organization referred to 
in Article 4". 
• t 
